S E C R E T
 
               ENCLOSURE "B"
 
     Subject: Apparent British Policy and Strategy with 
            relation to that of the United States.
 
   1. For brevity and clarity in discussing the British strate-
gic concept, the present C.C.S. concept, as interpreted in
J.C.S. 243/3 (Clarification of Casablanca Decisions) is taken
as a basis, and each paragraph thereof (typed in capitals) is 
discussed from what is believed to be the British point of view.
 
   I. OVERALL STRATEGY OF THE WAR
     (a) IN COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA AND THE LESSER ALLIES,
TO FORCE AN UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE.
     The British have accepted this over-all concept in
public announcements at Casablanca, and it is probable that
in making such announcements they were sincere at the moment.
However, we cannot overlook the possibility that the British
may have some mental reservations as to interpretation of
"unconditional surrender." This is indicated by Mr.
Churchill's speech of March 21, 1943, in which he says:
"Nevertheless, in my opinion, the moment when Hitler is
beaten and Germany and Italy are prostrate will mark the
climax of the war and that will be the time to make a new
declaration upon the task before us." Such reservations would
have their basis in the traditional British objection to
the development of a dominant military power on the main-
land of Europe. It is a possibility that they cannot
entirely overlook that as the war in Europe develops,
Russia and Germany may exhaust each other.  The British
will be concerned with the post-war position of France.
The British will probably desire a considerably weakened
Italy in order to enhance the British control of the
Mediterranean.
 
 
 
 
 
 
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