S E C R E T
 
     (b) SIMULTANEOUSLY, IN COOPERATION WITH THE OTHER PACIFIC
POWERS, TO MAINTAIN AND EXTEND UNREMITTING PRESSURE AGAINST
JAPAN.
 
     The British probably would be glad to accept this state-
ment with the words "and extend" omitted. However, were they to
write it themselves, it would probably read: "Simultaneously,
in cooperation with other Powers to prevent further advance
by the Japanese." This desire of the British to minimize the
war against Japan is a fundamental difference between the
British and American concepts.
     (c) THEREAFTER, IN COOPERATION WITH THE OTHER PACIFIC
POWERS AND IF POSSIBILE WITH RUSSIA, TO COMBINE THE FULL
RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN TO FORCE
THE UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF JAPAN.
     This statement has the definite approval of the Prime
Minister.    However, while at Casablanca, he offered a formal 
treaty in support of this commitment, in his speech of March
21st he suggests "a new declaration," when "Hitler is beaten."
The British are probably sincere in this commitment at the
moment. Much can happen, however, between now and the defeat
of Germany to blunt the British willingness to undertake an
"all-out" war against Japan. The British have consistently
indicated a surprising lack of concern about the Far East.
They may be counted upon to perform the letter of their com-
mitments in this connection, but they are traditionally expert
at meeting the letter while avoiding the spirit of commitments,
and such action in regard to British support of the war against
Japan should always be kept in mind as a possibility.
 
II.  BASIC STRATEGY FOR 1943
     TO CONDUCT A STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE AXIS IN
EUROPEAN - MEDITERRANEAN THEATER, EMPLOYING THE MAXIMUM
FORCES CONSISTENT WITH MAINTAINING AND EXTENDING UNREMITTING
PRESSURE AGAINST JAPAN, AND WITH MEETING CURRENT ACCEPTED                      
STRATEGIC COMMITMENTS.                      
 
 
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