S E C R E T
 
     for the amphibious attack on the RABAUL area. It is
     estimated that a minimum of two months will be required
     to complete the operations subsequent to the landing 
     attack on RABAUL. From the foregoing, it appears that
     the most optimistic estimates indicate that the BiSMARCK
     operations cannot be completed before April 1, 1944.
 
12. Operations in NEW GUINEA.
      a. Capture NEW GUINEA.
          After the seizure of the HUON PENINSULA and the capture
of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO, our strategic plans contemplate
operations to extend our line of communications through the
PACIFIC to the HALMAHERA-northwest CELEBES area. The control
of NEW GUINEA to include the VOGELKOP area is obviously es-
sential to accomplishing this objective.
     The concept of operations for the seizure of NEW GUINEA,
envisages the projection of our line of communications to
the VOGALKOP region by the successive seizure of air bases
along the north and southwest coasts.
     The initial phases of operations along the north coast
consist primarily of air-ground action, covered by air and 
fleet operations to prevent interference by enemy counter-
attacks. Ground forces will be employed in the seizure of
air bases by shore- to- shore amphibious operations.
     In order to gain control of the ARAFURA-BANDA seas and of
the south coast of NEW GUINEA, it will be necessary to seize
AROE, KEI, and possibly TANIMBAR Island.
    b. The operations to capture NEW GUINEA will consist of
two phases as follows:
     PHASE I
     (1) Seizure of north coast of NEW GUINEA to include
CAPE D'URVILLE.
     (2) Establishment of an air base on southwest coast of
NEW GUINEA as a preliminary to seizure of the AROE Islands. 
Possible occupation of TANIMBAR Island. 
 
 
 
 
                    - 10 -