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Hitler and Mussolini would be very helpful in the weeks to come.
The answer which the Nazis will give is apt to confound the German
people. It might be different if the President perhaps at the 
end of July would make some open step to call in a conference of
the five or six main Powers which might be met by a refusal on
the part of Hitler but not perhaps by Mussolini. Of course it
should be done in a way that Hitler does not get the impression
that a new Munich is in preparation. He must be frightened of the
consequences for the moral of the German army and the German
nation if he gives a blank refusal. It should not come too early 
and I do not press this suggest ion too strongly. My wish and
my hopes are that President Roosevelt maintains such a position
which would enable him to render far more tmp0rtant services as
a mediator and arbiter at a given phase when war really has
started. In expressing such an opinion I take into consideration
the real feelings of the majority of the Army and of the vast
majority of the German nation which are strongly against any war.
I Shall of course not make the slightest suggestion of this kind
when I meet your Ambassador some time next week as he has asked
me come to see him. I have hesitated very much to go to see
him, but now I would like to find out what is true in all the
stories going all around the press in London about his feelings 
towards the Nazis. 
 
 
I have not seen Dr. Brettauer since I came back to Europe.
Having in mind the terrible fate of his cousin Strakosch of
Vienna he left during the war scare Switzerland and was hesitating
 
 
to