TARANTO facilities for our use. The operation against the 
Toe, moreover, would not represent any threat to the BALKANS. 
Of more significance, despite our initial intentions, either 
operation might lead to a long and indecisive campaign of 
major proportions on. the peninsula of ITALY. Being incon-
sistent with the basic MEDITERRANEAN strategy recommended in 
J.C.S. 288/1, this eventuality must be avoided if possible.
 
     b. It hss been shown thst the seizure oF the Toe of ITALY 
would involve some 9 divisions. Having the Toe, the seizure 
of the Heel by amphibious operations would probably require 
using sn additional 7 to 9 divisions. Thus, the total ground 
forces, 16 to 18 divisions, involved in operations in 
southern ITALY would exceed the 11 divisions that it is 
estimeted will become available after a successful HUSKY. 
Operations against the Toe are, therefore, unacceptable as 
a preliminary to operations sgainst the Heel.
 
     c. Assuming that HUSKY is completed by mid-August, 1943, 
operations against either the Toe or the Heel could not be 
initiated prior to October. By that time it is more than
likely that the major 1943 offensives in RUSSIA will have been
launched. It is wishful thinking, therefore, to believe that 
any operation, following HUSKY, within UNITED NATIONS capa-
bilities in the MEDITERRANEAN in 1943, will cause important 
diversion of AXIS forces (air or ground) from the more 
decisive battles that may then be taking place in RUSSIA. 
Reasoning, however, on the dubious assumption that such a 
diversion of AXIS forces might be accomplished, or adding the 
assumption that the situation in RUSSIA is so critical that a
bold and risky operation must be undertaken, the more decisive 
operation against the Heel of ITALY (as compared to the Toe) 
would be the more acceptable.
 
     d. Assuming a situation whereby a limited-scale operation 
might force ITALY out of the war necessarily presupposes that
 
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