S E C R E T
 
       (3) Operations in eastern NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES
                  Retained.    Due to limitation of forces, operations
     other than air warfare should be restricted to the seizure
     of those islands necessary to the capture of NEW GUINEA.
       (4) Operations in the MARSHALL ISLANDS
                 Retained.    Shortens line ofcommunications to
           SOUTHEAST PACIFIC and CELEBES SEA.
       (5) Operations in the CAROLINE ISLANDS
                 Retained. Necessary to gain control of central
           PACIFIC, thereby facilitating establishment of line of
           communications to CELEBES SEA. Will enable UNITED NATIONS
           forces to directly threaten the Japanese Archipelago.
      (6) Operations in the northern PACIFIC, after the
                  ejection of Japanese from the ALEUTIANS
           Rejected. Not in accordance with strategic concept.
 
3. Conclusions:
    a. Offensive operations in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST in 
1943-1944 should hsve the following objectives'
     (1) Conduct of air operations in and from CHINA.
     (2) Seizure of BURMA.
     (3) Ejection of the Japanese from the ALEUTIANS.
     (4) Seizure of the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS.
     (5) Seizure of the SOLOMONS, the BIS~IARCK ARCHIPELAG0,
    and Japenese held NEW GUINEA.
    b. Operations to gain these objectives will be restricted
by the availability of trained amphibious divisions and
amphibious craft.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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