S E C R E T
 
                                          ENCLOSURE "A"
 
    OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST IN 1943-44
 
                            STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
     4. To prepare an analysis of possible UNITED NATIONS courses 
of action in the PACIFIC-Asiatic ares. in 1943 and 1944, in con-
formity with UNITED NATIONS strategy.
  
                                          ASSUMPTIONS
    5. It is assumed that:
        a. CHINA will continue in the war against JAPAN.
        b. It is the intention of JAPAN to invade SIBERIA at a 
    time advantageous to her and disadvantageous to RUSSIA, and
    before GERMANY is defeated.
 
   6. After a thorough estimate of the situation for 1943-44 was 
made, it was concluded that in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST:
       a. The UNITED NATIONS should conduct limited offensive 
    operations in order to maintain pressure on JAPAN, retain the 
    initiative, and attain or retain positions of readiness for a 
    full-scale offensive against JAPAN, and in order to keep 
    CHINA in the war.
      b. For these purposes, UNITED STATES naval forces should be 
    increased to a maximum consistent with the minimum require-
    ments in the ATLANTIC, and with due regard to the requirements 
    of the main effort against the European AXIS, air and ground 
    forces should be provided so as to facilitate joint action 
    and make optimum use of the increasing strength of UNITED 
    STATES naval forces.
 
  7. J.C.S. 287/1 sets forth a strategic plan for the defeat of 
JAPAN. Bssed on this strategic plan for the defeat of JAPAN,
the following courses of action are open to the UNITED NATIONS:
 
 
 
 
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