imperilled. A second Axis operation was therefore designed 
      in order to save Mostar and complete the destruction of the Partisans. 
      Four fresh Italian divisions were employed and a German battle 
      group was drawn from a division in Serbia. The general aim of 
      the operation seems to have been to surround and destroy the 
      Partisans in the area around Livno between these fresh forces 
      and the three original German divisions which were attempting 
      to press South. Again the Germans met with preliminary success 
      and Livno was recaptured on the 3rd March. Confused fighting 
      then developed in the Neretva valley, which progressed not unfavourably 
      for the Partisans.
 
      
 
 
4. A new element was, however, now introduced into the situation. 
      The Italians had announced their intention of bringing up Cetniks 
      from Montenegro to check the southerly movement of the Partisans. 
      The Germans, who deplored Italian relations with the Montenegrin 
      Cetniks and who still regarded the whole Mihailovic movement 
      as a grave menace to their security, protested in vain against 
      this decision. One reason for their dislike of this step was 
      that they contemplated an operation against Mihailovic when once 
      the Partisans had been destroyed. Mihailovic himself expected 
      this and was anxious to drive the remnants of the Partisans back 
      to the North in order that they might continue to give the Axis 
      trouble in Bosnia. By the middle of March some 13,000 Cetniks, 
      supplied with Italian arms and ammunition, had arrived from Montenegro 
      in the battle areas, and the main body were brought into line 
      on the upper Neretva with the duty of preventing a Partisan break-through 
      to the South-East. It is interesting to note that the Germans 
      insisted that the Cetniks should be employed in areas where they 
      could not encounter German troops since the Cetniks were everywhere 
      determined to fight them. The Germans were also fearful lest 
      local conflicts should take place between Germans and the Italians 
      who were backing the Cetniks.
 
      
 
 
5. By the middle of March the op %eration against the Partisans 
      was, from a German point of view, over. One of the German divisions, 
      despite Italian indignation, was in Mostar and the bauxite mines 
      were again operating in safety. Another had moved East of Sarajevo, 
      while the remaining two were patrolling and mopping up in what 
      had been the battle area. Communications were restored between 
      Sarajevo and Mostar. The battle had now moved into Hercegovina 
      and had taken the form of a conflict between Cetniks and Partisans, 
      though Italian troops were also involved. Despite Cetnik claims 
      it is clear that the battle at first went against them and the 
      first assault of the Partisans carried them across the Neretva, 
      and in spite of the arrival of Cetnik reinforcements, the Partisans 
      continued to gain ground. The internecine conflict was obviously 
      to German taste and once they had seen the Partisans cross the 
      Neretva into an area in the Italian sphere of influence they 
      ceased their pursuit. Their forces, helped only inadequately 
      by those of their two satellites, the Italians and the Croats, 
      had disloged the Partisans from their stronghold in the Grimec 
      Planina and. had harried them for 150 miles over exceedingly 
      difficult country, whose wild character and bad communications 
      gave every, advantage of terrain to irregular troops. The Germans, 
      had, however, failed to surround or to annihilate their enemy.
 
      
 
 
6. As the campaign progressed the Germans had freely expressed 
      their doubts as to whether they could adequately garrison the 
      districts which they had cleaned up. Their apprehensions were 
      soon justified. It became evident that only a part of the Partisans 
      had been driven southwards. Others had somehow gone into hiding, 
      whence, as the Axis troops moved on, they began to emerge. Rallying 
      at local centres they then collected in the hills, South-West 
      of Bihac. To such good effect did they reorganise that in the 
      middle of April they were able to descend on Otocac and force 
      the Italians to abandon the town and valuable stores of food. 
      Other bands simultaneously began to assemble in other upland 
      areas of northern Yugoslavia. It is difficult to give any exact 
      estimate of their strength, which varied from day to day.
 
      
 
 
7. This major operation, extending from late January to mid-March, 
      was not the only occasion of fighting in Yugoslavia through these 
      months: The Partisans north of the River Save were increasingly 
      active and threatened the two railway lines from Oagreb to Belgrade. 
      On the last day of January the Germans commenced a ten days attack 
      in this area and succeeded in driving the guerrillas temporarily 
      into the remoter and wilder regions. But at the end of February 
      they were forced to undertake a further operation, presumably 
      against remnants of the same bands. Even then there was no appreciable 
      abatement in insurgent activity in these districts, and at the 
      end of March the