Axis embarked on a third operation. The Slavonian Partisans 
      were, however, no easier to destroy than their Bosnian colleagues, 
      and the German troops did not succeed in eradicating them from 
      their hilly strongholds. Axis forces amounting- to the equivalent 
      of rather more than one division were involved in these operations.
 
      
 
 
8. Another appreciable centre of unrest in Yugoslavia in the 
      first months of 1943 was in Eastern Bosnia. All over this district 
      there existed not only stray bands of Partisans but also groups 
      of Mihailovic's Cetniks. Here again, however, divergent tendencies 
      were becoming apparent. All Cetniks were prepared to fight the 
      "quisling" Croat Army, but not all were ready to join 
      with the Partisans in doing so, while others, faithful to the 
      orders of Mihailovic, attacked the Partisans and the Croats with 
      equal zest. These dissensions served as an indication of the 
      difficulties into which the policy at Cetnik headquarters was 
      leading the whole Cetnik movement. This confusion culminated 
      on the 28th February in a somewhat wild speech by Mihailovic 
      in which he bitterly abused the British (despite the presence 
      of our liaison officer) for the paucity of our help, and declared 
      that he would never abandon the Italians, who were his only friends. 
      The outburst provoked a sharp reprimand from the exiled Yugoslav 
      Government, in which Mihailovic was ordered to give up all compromising 
      relations and was roundly told that the British were his allies. 
      But before this message could reach him the course of events 
      had swept the Cetniks into battle with the Partisans, for which 
      the Cetniks received from the Italians, arms, equipment and even 
      food by air.
 
      
 
 
9. At the end of March the main Partisan body in Hercegovina 
      (see paragraph 5 above), at this time more than 15,000 strong 
      had advanced southwards and eastwards, after the passage of the 
      Neretva, with the object of crossing the Drina and breaking through 
      into the Sanjak. From there they could either pass into Serbia 
      or continue  %their migration southwards towards Greece. It seems 
      that the severe fighting of the last few months had served to 
      harden and train them; from then on, in any case, Partisan troops 
      began to operate more definitely as "divisions," and 
      their leader, Tito, began to dominate the scene. Leaving a weaker 
      force to hold the Cetniks on their flank, the main body, under 
      Tito, struck at the Drina line. Two Partisan divisions succeeded 
      in crossing the river near Gorazde, but early in May their further 
      progress eastwards was arrested by the arrival of a German division, 
      and they turned southwards towards Albania.
 
      
 
 
10. At this juncture the Germans decided to stage the operation 
      which had originally been designed to round up Mihailovic's Cetniks 
      in Montenegro, but was now directed primarily against the Partisans, 
      who had replaced them. It involved elements of five German, three 
      Italian and one Bulgarian divisions and met with strong opposition 
      from the Partisans. German figures for the casualties at the 
      end of the operations have been obtained from our intelligence. 
      There were some 3,000 German casualties as against 7,489 Partisans, 
      killed, plus further Partisan losses in wounded and prisoners 
      amounting to nearly 5,000 men. Some 3,500-4,000 Cetniks were 
      also taken prisoner. About 1,500 sorties were flown by Axis aircraft 
      in the course of the operations and 600 tons of bombs were dropped. 
      During the course of the operations it appeared at one moment 
      as if the whole Partisan force was surrounded, but most recent 
      messages from our liaison officers state that Tito and some 10,000 
      men succeeded in extricating themselves from the Axis net and 
      reached the area north-east of Sarajevo, where they are now re-forming. 
      Meanwhile, other Partisan groups have continued active. There 
      have been constant clashes in the area of Travnik; other bodies 
      are active between the Kupa and Una rivers, and others again 
      to the west of the lower Drina. Reports from British liaison 
      officers have also been received of activities in Slovenia and 
      Slavonia. The total Partisan strength in all these areas may 
      number 65,000 armed men.
 
      
 
 
11. In Serbia, where Mihailovic is still supreme, sabotage 
      also continues and is being actively directed by our liaison 
      officers. Most important has been an attack on the important 
      copper mine at Majdenpek in the north-eastern corner of Yugoslavia 
      and the sinking of shipping on the Danube. Mihailovic's following 
      in Serbia is very considerable, amounting to perhaps 20,000 armed 
      men. Our liaison officers consider that in the event of success 
      and provided arms could be made available, a further 130,000 
      men could be put into the field. It should be also remembered 
      that prior to the period under review Mihailovic had carried 
      out many successful operations against the enemy.