12. According to our information, a further large-scale operation 
      against Tito and his Partisans in the Sarajevo area is planned 
      for mid-July. This is likely to involve not less than six divisions. 
      Elsewhere sporadic activity by the guerrillas calls for repeated 
      action by German, Italian and Croat troops and there is evidence 
      that from no area can troops be spared for operations elsewhere. 
      A detailed analysis of Axis forces appears at Annex A. A summary 
      of air operations appears at Annex C.
 
      An analysis of sabotage carried out since the 1st May, 1943, 
      appears at Annex D.
 
      A statement of brutalities committed by the Axis and their satellites 
      appears at Annex F.
 
      A German order on method of carrying out mass executions appears 
      at Annex G.
 
      II.--GREECE.
 
      (See Sketch Map B.)
 
      
 
 
13. Serious guerrilla activity in Greece is much more recent 
      than in Yugoslavia and it is only since the beginning of this 
      year that it has begun to cause the Axis really grave concern. 
      But by January the guerrillas had succeeded in obtaining control 
      of most of the mountainous districts of Central and Northern 
      Greece except for the towns and the lines of communication, and 
      since that time their power has regularly increased, until now 
      they constitute a very serious menace to Axis forces in the country. 
      Political differences unfortunately exist between the various 
      groups, the most important of which are that of Oervas (Right 
      Wing) in Western Greece and that known as E.L.A.S., under Left-wing 
      control, in the rest of the country. Though collaboration between 
      these parties has in the past not always been all that can be 
      desired, serious quarrels resulting in civil war which have done 
      so much harm in Yugoslavia have been avoided. The most recent 
      reports from our liaison officers in Greece state that for the 
      present the various bands have agreed to work together satisfactorily 
      under British guidance. They will accept the orders of C.-in-C., 
      Middle East, issued through the numerous British liaison of %ficers 
      in so far as the planning and timing of operations are concerned.
 
      
 
 
14. The first important move was the destruction, under British 
      direction, of the Gorgopotamos Bridge on the Athens-Salonika 
      railway late in 1942; this took some six weeks to repair. During 
      January 1943 there were no large-scale activities, but in February 
      and early March a series of harassing moves were undertaken by 
      the guerrillas in Thessaly and Pindus, which resulted in fairly 
      serious Axis casualties; we know that in February a column of 
      some 250 Italians was routed, only ten of whom escaped, and that 
      in another action quite a large number of Germans were shot. 
      These small actions continued throughout April and caused such 
      difficulties for the Axis that by May troop movements in Central 
      Greece were only possible when made in considerable force, and 
      main routes of communication could be kept operative only if 
      constantly guarded and patrolled. On the 16th April the guerrillas 
      captured and held for 36 hours the town of Amphiclea (15,000 
      inhabitants) and destroyed all the railway facilities, including 
      nine locomotives. In addition, during April and early May four 
      bauxite mines in the Parnassus region were put out of action 
      and the production of the chrome mines in Thessaly was reduced 
      by two-thirds.
 
      
 
 
15. In Western Greece, in order to counter these activities, 
      the Italians undertook an operation involving at least one division; 
      this was unsuccessful. The Germans, finding that the protection 
      afforded by the Italians to chrome mines in Thessaly and to the 
      Athens-Salonika road and railway was ineffective, sent troops 
      to Lamia, Larissa and Katerine and took over most of the policing 
      of the railway. Sweeps on a large scale into the surrounding 
      country were made from these centres, but on each occasion the 
      guerrillas, escaped, thanks to their mobility and good intelligence. 
      As a result of this ill-success, offensive action was initiated 
      on a more extensive scale in the last week of May. This included 
      the wholesale bombing and burning of villages. At the same time 
      two additional German divisions were despatched to Greece, one 
      of which was probably sent more with the object of engaging the 
      guerrillas than with that of resisting a possible Allied invasion; 
      it was soon engaged in Epirus.