2
2. This decision has been taken inresponse to your appeal for
a "common stand." There is a good deal of anxiety in
the War Cabinet. I do not myself see where this policy is leading
to nor what we expect to get out of the Argentines by this method.
I only hope it will not adversely affect our vital interests
and our war effort.
3. I hope you will not mind my saving, as is my duty, that
we ourselves were placed in an invidious position by this American
decision, to which we are now asked to conform being taken without
consultation with us. We were faced with a fait accompl
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT to PRIME MINISTER.
T. 1415/4. 6.7.44.
Your 723 of 1st July, 1944, was genuinely welcome. Your favorable
decision on the recall of Kelly concurrently with us and others
has already produced significant concrete results. The immediate
reaction has been prompt, conciliatory and definitely in the
right direction, with complete absence of irritation of threats
toward any country. If we continue to stand firm, letting the
Farrel Regime understand, in a tone not necessarily unfriendly,
that it cannot in violation of its pledge of hemispheric unity
and solidarity support the Axis in opposition to its sister nations,
there is a good chance that this entire matter can soon be cleared
up. It is everywhere recognized that the issue at stake in Argentina
is the same as that which is involved in the war against the
Axis. I am confident, therefore, that there is not any risk in
pursuing a firm and forthright policy toward the Farrell Regime.
Again my heartiest thanks.
*T. 1394/4.
PRIME MINISTER To PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.
T. 1447/4. 14.7.44.
I ought to send you the immediately following* minute I have
received from Mr. Llewellin, the British Food Minister. We wish
to do everything we can to help you and Mr. Hull with the South
American countries; but we think you ought to have the formidable %
arguments of this minute before you. Please remember that this
community of 46 millions imported 66 million tons a year before
the war and is now managing on less than 25 millions. The stamina
of the workman cannot be maintained on a lesser diet in meat.
You would not send your soldiers into battle on the British Service
meat ration, which is far above what is given to workmen. Your
people are eating per head more meat and more poultry than before
the war while ours are most sharply cut. I believe that if this
were put before Mr. Hull he would do all he could to help us
to obtain a new contract and nothing which would jeopardize,
its chances. I therefore hope that you will do so.
*T. 1448/4.
PRIME MINISTER to PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.
T. 1448/4. 14.7.44.
Following is minute referred to in my immediately preceding telegram*
:--
I am very worried at the position into which we are getting with
the Argentine.
I depend upon that country for over 40 per cent of my imported
meat. If I fail to get it, the 1s. 2d. meat ration will have
to be reduced by about 5d. Even a temporary loss of supplies
will reduce the ration.
We are very grateful to the Americans for the meat they are
sending us.
I do not believe that they can send us such an increase as
to make up for the loss of our supplies from the Argenti
In any event, such additional meat would be largely pork and
we have too great a proportion of that now.
The meat we get from the Argentine is beef and mutton.
My present contract with the Argentine runs out in October.
I am anxious to renew it for three to four years, in order to
make sure that the people of this country will get the meat they
want and need, not only for the rest of the war, but for the
period of shortage afterwards.
It is going to be most difficult for me to persuade the Argentines
to let me have all their exportable surplus of meat for this
period, unless we can
*T. 1447/4.