-5-
 
      
 
 
(and his friends in the British Conservative Party) there 
      are no illusions in the German General Staff as to the decisive 
      change in the situation which would arise from a definite military 
      commitment between the British and the Russians.
 
      
 
 
The general impression in informed circles both In London 
      and Paris is that the situation is reaching its most critical 
      point: and that the key to it lies in London, and particularly 
      in the question of whether or not the "appeasers" continue 
      to be able to delay signature of a practical Anglo-Soviet Pact.
 
      
 
 
For it is pointed out in both capitals that although -- except 
      in the columns of The Times -- the appeasers have been lying 
      comparatively low in public during the past week, they have in 
      fact been doing so because their principal concentration has 
      been precisely upon the wrecking of the Pact, or at least upon 
      the prolongation of the endless delay.
 
      
 
 
As a result, Berlin estimates very high the chances that the 
      "appeasers" are still in fact in power in Britain: 
      and so long as they are strong enough to delay the Pact, no amount 
      of finger-wagging from members of the Government and in the editorial 
      columns of the London press will have any effect in "persuading" 
      Herr von Ribbentrop that he is mistaken in this matter.
 
      
 
 
The danger therefore is a double one: first that the appeasers 
      without actually being in power may give to the German Government 
      the impression that they are, long enough and deeply enough to 
      provoke a disaster; and secondly, that, having produced that 
      situation, they may actually turn out to be near enough to power 
      to make of that disaster not a resistance but "a second 
      Munich",
 
      
 
 
The Rushcliffe Letter
 
      
 
 
From an exceedingly well-informed source it is confirmed to 
      us this week that the real author of the now notorious "Rushcliffe 
      Letter" to The Times, calling for "a second Munich" 
      all along the line really was d %rafted by Sir Horace Wilson, and 
      therefore represented exactly the views and aims of the appeasers 
      at No.10.
 
      
 
 
It appears, according to sources in Berlin, to be this fact 
      above all-- communicated of course, by the German Embassy and 
      by unofficial agents -- which accounts, for what all agree to 
      be an air of intense confidence and jauntiness on the part of 
      Herr yon Ribbentrop. Confident that the Rushcliffe letter (a) 
      represents the views of No.10 and (b) would never have been published 
      in such a form unless it did, he is still this week advising 
      the Fuehrer that everything pointing the other way -- including 
      the Chamberlain speech at the Albert Hall -- is and must be the 
      merest bluff.
 
      
 
 
The fact that after relegating the "appeasement" 
      correspondence to its inside columns for a day or two, The Times 
      suddenly gave it pride of place again, was also -- absurdly as 
      some think but seriously nevertheless -- taken in Berlin as a 
      useful straw in the wind.
 
      It was also remarked there that The Times went so far as to publish 
      a letter from a Territorial Officer of which the argument, if