Page 2                                      No, 230
 
7. No evidence (?German) striking force being created now,
nor do we consider a striking force sufficient for large scale
operation can be created so long as the Russian offensive is
maintained. Assuming for the sake of argument that stabilisa-
tion is reached by 15th February, earliest date by which divi-
sion (including divisions which may be made available from
detached squadrons) for large scaIe operations could be with-
drawn,  rested and restored, would be the 1st May. So far as
Russia is concerned large scale operations unlikely to take
place owing thaw during April, and the consequently difficulty
of movement.
 
     Possible courses of German action.
 
8.   (A) A renewed offensive along the whole Russian front.
For reasons already given this is most unlikely, if not wholly
impossible as yet.
 
          (B) A thrust in the south towards Caucasia (while containing 
Russian army in north and centre).
 
     Germany must secure, at the earliest opportunity possible 
substantial supplies of oil. She can only obtain fabric oil 
in Caucasia or Iraq. For reasons given below, Caucasia is the 
most likely major operation.
 
9. A thrust through Turkey (?towards) Syria and thence to Iraq
for Egypt. Advance through Turkey into Iraq would put Germany
in possession of oil fields potentially capable of meeting her
needs. Would deprive us of oil on which our Eastern Mediterranean
naval position partly depends. Would bring Germany within
striking distance of Abadan and open way to a further advance
into Egypt. On the other hand transport of oil from Iraq would
be more difficult than from Caucasia, at least until Germany                                                           
had a secure sea route through  Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover,
even if Turkey acquiesced in passage of German forces through
her territory Germans would be undertaking new military commit-
ments. Seems unlikely that Turkey would acquiesce unless Russian
army defeated or we had suffered such reverses that she felt con-
fident that Germany would win the war.                   
 
10. Operation in central and western Mediterranean areas
(a) through Iberian Peninsula against Gibraltar and French
North Africa. Advantage to be gained substantial but operation
would involve Germany in another military commitment in theatre
of war remote from main source of oil and other supplies. 0ccu-
pation of Peninsula would subsequently be a heavy economic
liability. This operation therefore appears likely, only in
order to counter or forestall action against ourselves or
America. (b) Through North Africa ports against Egypt from
west, possibly in conjunction vrith an attack through Turkey.
Germans will attempt to maintain and exploit their position
in North Africa, and for this purpose reinforce Rommel with
forces necessary. Presence of strong air force in central
Mediterranean area would serve to neutralise Malta and protect-
communication with Tripoli. Germany may try to capture Malta.