Will the British resist Japanese aggression directed
 
only against the Netherlands East Indies?
 
     Should both firmly resist, what local military assis-
 
tance  will they require from the United States to ensure success?
 
              No light on these questions has been thrown by the 
 
report of the proceedings of  the recent Singapore Conference.
 
     The basic character of  a war against Japan by the
 
British and Dutch would be the fixed defense of the Malay
 
Peninsula, Sumatra and Java. The allied army, naval, and air
 
forces now in position are considerable, and some future
 
reenforcement may be expected from Australia and New Zealand.
 
Borneo and the islands to the East are vulnerable. There is
 
little chance for an allied offensive. Without Dutch assis-
 
tance, the external effectiveness of the British bases at
 
Hong Kong and Singapore would soon disappear.
 
     The Japanese deployment in Manchukuo and China
 
requires much of their Army, large supplies and merchant
 
tonnage, and some naval force. It is doubtful if Japan will
 
feel secure in withdrawing much strength from in front of
 
Russia, regardless of non-aggression agreements. The winter
 
lull in China will probably permit the withdrawal of the forces
 
they need for a campaign against Malaysia. The availability
 
of ample supplies for such a campaign is problematical.
 
     Provided the British and Dutch cooperate in a vigorous
 
and efficient defense of Malaysia, Japan will need to make a
 
                              -8-