major effort with all categories of military force to capture
 
the entire area. The campaign might even last several months.
 
Whether Japan would concurrently be able successfully to
 
attack Hong Kong and the Philippines, and also strongly to
 
support the fixed positions in the Mid-Pacific, seems doubtful.
 
     During such a campaign, due to her wide dispersion of
 
effort, Japan would, unquestionably, be more vulnerable to
 
attack by the United States (or by Russia) than she would be
 
once Malaysia is in her possession.
 
             This brings us to a consideration of the strategy of
 
an American war against Japan, that is, either the so-called
 
"Orange Plan", or a modification. It must be understood that 
 
the Orange Plan was drawn up to govern our operations when
 
the United States and Japan are at war, and no other nations
 
are involved.
 
              You have heard enough of the Orange Plan to know that, 
 
in a nutshell, it envisages our Fleet's proceeding westward 
 
through the Marshalls and the Carolines, consolidating as it
 
goes, and then on to the recapture of the Philippines. Once 
 
there, the Orange Plan contemplates the eventual economic 
 
starvation of Japan, and, finally, the complete destruction
 
of her external military power. Its accomplislnnent would
 
require several years, and the absorption of the full military,
 
naval, and economic energy of the American people.
 
             In proceeding through these Mid-Pacific islands, we
 
have several subsidiary objectives in mind. First, we hope 
 
that our attack will induce the Japanese to expose their fleet
 
 
                               -9-