Should we adopt the present Orange Plan today, or any 
 
modification of that plan which involves the movement of very 
 
strong naval and army contingents to the Far East, we would 
 
have to accept considerable danger in the Atlantic, and would 
 
probably be unable to augment our material assistance to Great
 
Britain.
 
     We should, therefore, examine other plans which
 
involve a war having a more limited objective than the complete 
 
defeat of Japan, and in which we would undertake hostilities 
 
only in cooperation with the British and Dutch, and in which
 
these undertake to provide an effective and continued resistance
 
in Malaysia.
 
     Our involvement in war in the Pacific might well make
 
us also an ally of Britain in the Atlantic. The naval forces
 
remaining in the Atlantic, for helping our ally and for defending
 
ourselves, would, byjust so much, reduce the power which the
 
United States Fleet could put forth in the Pacific.
 
     The objective in a limited war against Japan would be
 
the reduction of  Japanese offensive power chiefly through
 
economic blockade. Under one concept, allied strategy would
 
comprise holding the Malay Barrier, denying access to other
 
sources of supply in Malaysia, severing her lines of communica-
 
tion with the Western Hemisphere, and raiding communications to
 
the Mid-Pacific, the Philippines, China, and Indo-China. United 
 
States defensive strategy would also require army reenforcement
 
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