of Alaska and the Hawaiian Islands, the establishment of naval
 
bases in the Fiji - Samoan and Gilbert Islands areas, and
                   
denial to Japan/of the use of the Marshalls as light force bases.
 
We might be able to re-enforce the Philippine garrison,
 
particularly with aircraft. I do not believe that the British
 
and Dutch alone could hold the Malay Barrier without direct
 
military assistance by the United States. In addition to help
 
from our Asiatic Fleet, I am convinced that they would need
 
further reenforcement by ships and aircraft drawn from our
 
Fleet in Hawaii, and possibly even by troops.
 
     Besides military aid for the allied defense forces,
 
our intervention would bring them a tremendous moral stimulus.
 
     An alternative concept of the suggested limited war
 
would be to provide additional support from the main body of
 
the Fleet either by capturing the Marshalls, or by capturing
 
both the Marshalls and Carolines. This, or a similar fleet
 
activity, would be for the purpose of diverting away from
 
Malaysia important Japanese forces to oppose it, and thus
 
reducing the strength of their assault against the Dutch
 
and British.
 
     But we should consider the prospect that the losses
 
which we would incur in such operations might not be fruitful
 
of compensating results. Furthermore, withdrawal of the Fleet
 
from captured positions for transfer to the Atlantic would
 
be more difficult.
 
                              -15-