Should we adopt Plan (C), we must face the consequences 
 
that would ensue were we to start a war with one plan, and 
 
then, after becoming heavily engaged, be forced greatly to 
 
modify it or discard it altogether, as, for example, in case 
 
of a British fold up. On neither off.these distant fronts 
 
would it be possible to execute a really major offensive. 
 
Strategically, the situation might become disastrous should 
 
our effort on either front fail.
 
              (D) Shall we direct our efforts toward an eventual 
 
strong offensive in the Atlantic as an ally of the British, 
 
and a defensive in the Pacific? Any strength that we might 
 
send to the Far East would, by just so much, reduce the force 
 
of our blows against Germany and Italy. About the least that 
 
we would do for our ally would be to send strong naval light 
 
forces and aircraft to Great Britain and the Mediterranean. 
 
Probably we could not stop with a purely naval effort. The 
 
plan might ultimately require capture of the Portuguese and 
 
Spanish Islands and military and naval bases in Africa and 
 
possibly Europe; and thereafter even involve undertaking a full 
 
scale land offensive. In consideration of a course that would 
 
require landing large numbers oi' troops abroad, account must 
 
be taken of the possible unwillingness of the people of the 
 
United States to support land operations of this character, 
 
and to incur the risk of  heavy loss should Great Britain 
 
collapse. Under Plan (D) we would be unable to exert strong
 
 
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