the Atlantic, or, at least, until after we should have defeated 
 
Japan decisively, and thus had fully curbed her offensive power 
 
for the time being. Plans for augmenting the scale of our 
 
present material assistance to Great Britain would be adversely 
 
affected until Japan had been decisively defeated. The length 
 
of time required to defeat Japan would be very considerable.
 
              If we enter the war against Japan and then if Great 
 
Britain loses, we probably would in any case have to reorient 
 
towards the Atlantic. There is no dissenting view on this 
 
point.
 
              (C) Shall we plan for sending the strongest possible 
 
military assistance both to the British in Europe, and to the 
 
British, Dutch and Chinese in the Far East? The naval and air 
 
detachments we would send to the British Isles would possibly 
 
ensure their continued resistance, but would not increase 
 
British power to conduct a land offensive. The strength we 
 
could send to the Far East might be enough to check the south-
 
ward spread of Japanese rule for the duration of the war. The 
 
strength of naval forces remaining in Hawaii for the defense of 
 
the Eastern Pacific, and the strength of the forces in the
 
Western Atlantic for the defense of that area, would be reduced 
 
to that barely sufficient for executing their tasks. Should 
 
Great Britain finally lose, or should Malaysia fall to Japan, 
 
our naval strength might then be found to have been seriously
 
reduced, relative to that of  the Axis powers. It should be 
 
understood that, under this plan, we would be operating under the
 
handicap of fighting major wars on two fronts.
 
 
                               -22-