tisams being able to be supplied from outside the country rega-
 
larly and safely by sea rather than by air, (2) the United Nations
 
having the supplies, the ships, the personnel, and the
 
desire to so supply them. Even if both these conditions were
 
met, some re-training of Partisan troops and officers would be
 
needed in order, for them to make effectively the change-over
 
from guerrilla tactics to those of regular modern mechanized
 
warfare. There is one other very important factor in the Par-
 
tisan over-all military situation. This has to do with the
 
difference between the Partisans' present military effective-
 
ness, divided as it is between action against Axis troops and
 
action against collaborationist Jugoslav troops, as against the
 
possible total military effectiveness of a united militant Jugo-
 
slav poprelation all concentrated against the enemy and with
 
disaffected elements collaborating with the enemy This is one
 
of the principal points upon which military and political con-
 
siderations about the country converge.
 
     M. ESTIMATE OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE
    OVER-ALL SITUATION DURING THE PAST SIX MONTHS
 
     In October, 1943, the most reliable estimates gave the Par-
 
tisans a total troop strength of between 210,000 and 220~000.
 
The present estimates give them between 290,000 and 320,000. Six
 
months ago the Partisans were much worse off with respect to cloth-
 
ing, arms, and ammuaition, since when large quantities of British