- 23 - him from the air; and that this same spirit which shows itself in Partisan conversation as boastfmlness is probably no small part of the spirit which, in their most hopeless moments, en- abled them to continue their resistance and somehow survive. L. OVER-.ALL ESTIMATE OF PARITISAN MILITARY SITUATION It seems unlikely and practically impossible that the Par- tisans are in a position to accomplish any of the following three military objectives: (1) Drive the enemy from their country. (2) Prevent the enemy from withdrawing from their country. (3) Annihilate the enemy from within their country. The Partisans are in a position to harry the enemy at many points and to influence the enemy situation by making it more difficult for him to do the things he wants to do --more difficult to en- joy bhe material resources within the country, more difficult to move troops and supplies around within the country, more difficult- to maintain troop strength and morale since enemy troops are being frequently killed and wounded albeit in small numbers. It is doubtless true also that the presence ands strength of the Partisans necessarily increases both the ememy expectation of an Allied invasion and his fear of the consequences of such an invasion. The previously outlined limitations on Partisan activities against the enemy could only be removed by (1) the Par- |