tional and 1,400 transport aircraft.
 
2,   She has recently increased naval and air forces in the Mediterranean. Considerable number
of submarines and small craft have arrived in this area and large stocks of oil have been
accumulated at Mediterranean ports.
 
3.   We believe the supply increase intended chiefly for protection of Axis communication with
North Africa to neutralize Malta, and to insure against a successful British advance to the Tunis
frontier.
 
4.        On Russian front the initiative still in Russia's hands and German forces withdrawing under
strong pressure. As yet, no sign of present Russian offensive exhausting itself. Until it does, it will
be impossible for Germany to withdraw substantial forces from Russia to rest and refit so as to
form a striking force for renewal of offensive on the Russian, front or for large scale operations in
other theatres of war.
 
5.   On the contrary, we know Flak defenses in Ukraine are being strengthened at the expense
of Roumania and that other air units including air force troops, recently withdrawn from Russian
front are being hurriedly returned there after  minimum time spent in rest and refit.
 
 6.       Owing to reduction in strength of German Air Force unlikely that Germany will be able to
make available sufficient air force to contain Russians and at the same time undertake large scale
operations elsewhere. Further, this wealmess will compel Germany to limit her offensive to one
major operation only where she might hope to concentrate on air force sufficient to give her local
superiority. To achieve this she would have to reduce her air force elsewhere to a minimum
required for security.
 
 7.       No evidence (German) striking force being created now, nor do we consider a striking
force sufficient for large scale operation can be created so long as the Russian offensive is
maintained. Assuming for the sake of argument that stabilization is reached by 15th February,
earliest date by which division (includ-
 
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