ing divisions which may be made available from detached squadrons for large scale operations
could be wlthdravm, rested and restored, would be the 1st May.  So far as Russia is concerned
large scale operations unlikely to take place owing thaw during April, and the consequently
difficulty of movement.
               Possible courses of German action.
8.        (A) A renewed offensive along the whole Russian front.  For reasons already given
this is most unlikely, if not wholly impossible as yet.
          (B) A thrust in the south towards Caucasia (while containing Russian army in
north and centre).
     Germany must secure, at the earliest opportunity possible substantial supplies of oil. She
can only obtain fabric oil in Caucasia or Iraq. For reasons given below, Caucasia is the  most
likely major operation.
9.        A thrust through Turkey (towards) Syria and thence to Iraq and/or Egypt.
Advance through Turkey into Iraq would put Germany in possession of oil fields potentially
capable of meeting h needs. Would deprive us of oil on which our Eastern Mediterranean
naval position partly depends. Would bring Germany within striking distance of Abadon and open
way to a further advance into Egypt. On the other hand transport of oil from Iraq would be moro
difficult than from Caucasia at least until Germany had a secure sea route through Eastern
Mediterranean. Moreover, even if Turkey acquiesced in passage of Gorman forces through her
territory Germans would be undertaking new military commitments.  Seems unlikely that Turkoy
would acquicsce unless Russian army defeated or we had suffered such reverses that she felt
confident that Germany would win the war.
10.       Operation in central and western Mediterranean areas
(a) through Iberian Peninsula against Gibraltar and French North Africa. Advantage to be gained
substantial but operation would involve Germany in another military commitment in theatre of
war remote from main source of oil and other supplies. Occupation of
 
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