intervene for the purpose of preventing the disruption of the
 
British Empire, or German capture of the British Isles.
 
     (e) We should also consider the alternative of now re-
 
maining out of war, and devoting ourselves exclusively to
 
building up our defense of the Western Hemisphere, plus the
 
preservation by peaceful means of our Far Eastern interests,
 
and plus also continued material assistance to Great Britain.
 
     As I see it, our major national objectives in the
 
immediate future might be stated as preservation of the terri-
 
torial, economic, and ideological integrity of the United
 
States, plus that of the remainder of the Western Hemisphere; 
 
the prevention of the disruption of the British Empire, with
 
all that such a consummation implies; and the diminution of 
 
the offensive military power of Japan, with a view to the re-
 
tention of our economic and political interests in the Far
 
East. It is doubtful, however, that it would be in our interest
 
to reduce Japan to the status of an inferior military and 
 
economic power. A balance of  power in the Far East is to our
 
interest as much as is a balance of power in Europe.
 
     The questions that confront me are concerned with the 
 
preparation and distribution of the naval forces of the United 
 
States, in cooperation with its military forces, for use in
 
war in the accomplishment of all or part of these national
 
objectives.
 
                              -3-