It is out of the question to consider sending our
 
entire Fleet at once to Singapore. Base facilities are far
 
too limited, the supply problem would be very great, and
 
Hawaii, Alaska, and our coasts would be greatly exposed to
 
raids.
 
     One point to remember, in connection with a decision
 
to adopt a limited offensive role, as in both of the alterna-
 
tive plans just mentioned, is that, in case of reverses,
 
public opinion may require a stronger effort. For example,
 
should Japanese success in the Far East seem imminent, there
 
would be great pressure brought to bear to support our force
 
there, instead of leaving it hanging in the air. Thus, what
 
we might originally plan as a limited war with Japan might
 
well become an unlimited war; our entire strength would then
 
be required in the Far East, and little force would remain
 
for eventualities in the Atlantic and for the support
 
British Isles.
 
     Let us now look eastward, and examine our possible
 
action in the Atlantic.
 
             In the first place, if we avoid serious commitment
 
in the Pacific, the purely American Atlantic problem,
 
envisaging defense of our coasts, the Caribbean, Canada, and
 
South America, plus giving strong naval assistance to Britain,
 
is not difficult so long as the British are able to maintain
 
their present naval activity. Should the British Isles then
 
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