fall we would find ourselves acting alone, and at war with the
 
world. To repeat, we would be thrown back on our haunches.
 
              Should we enter the war as an ally of Great Britain, 
 
and not then be at war with Japan, we envisage the British
 
asking us for widespread naval assistance. Roughly, they would
 
want us, in the Western Atlantic Ocean from Cape Sable to Cape
 
Horn, to protect shipping against raiders and submarine activi-
 
ties. They would also need strong reenforcements for their
 
escort and minesweeping forces in their home waters; and strong
 
flying boat reconnaissance from Scotland, the Atlantic Islands,
 
and Capetown. They might ask us to capture the Azores
 
the Cape Verde Islands. To their home waters they would have us
 
send submarines and small craft, and to the Mediterranean
 
assistance of any character which we may be able to provide.
 
They would expect us to take charge of allied interests in the
 
Pacific,  and to send a naval detachment to Singapore.
 
     This purely naval assistance, would not, in my
 
opinion, assure final victory for Great Britain. Victory would
 
probably depend upon her ability ultimately to make a land
 
offensive against the Axis powers. For making a successful
 
land offensive, British man power is insufficient. Offensive
 
troops from other nations will be required. I believe that
 
the United States, in addition to sending naval assistance,
 
would also need to send large air and land forces to Europe
 
or Africa, or both, and to participate strongly in this land
 
offensive. The naval task of transporting an army abroad
 
would be large.
 
                              -17-